





















































5	The	 practise	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Administrative	 Court	 of	 Finland	 is	 an	 illustrative	example	of	how	rarely	a	court	of	a	civil	law	country	is	willing	to	implement	those	first	paragraphs	of	environmental	statutes	that	include	specified	aims:	see	text	at	n	54-5.	
















																																																																																																																																																																							a	better	relationship	between	sustainability	and	law	–	for	an	overview	of	the	concept,	see	 Klaus	 Bosselmann,	 The	 Principle	 of	 Sustainability:	 Transforming	 Law	 and	
Governance	 (Ashgate,	 Aldershot	 2008),	 Hans	 Christian	 Bugge	 and	 Christina	 Voigt,	
Sustainable	 development	 in	 international	 and	 national	 law:	what	 did	 the	 Brundtland	
report	 do	 to	 legal	 thinking	 and	 legal	 development,	 and	where	 can	we	 go	 from	 here?	(The	 Avosetta	 series;	8,	 Europa	 Law	 Publishing	 2008)	 or	 	 Alan	 Boyle	 and	 David	Freestone	 (eds),	 International	 Law	and	 Sustainable	Development:	 Past	Achievements	
and	Future	Challenges	(Oxford	University	Press	1999).	A	somewhat	critical	approach	to	 the	use	of	 the	 concept	 is	presented	by	Vaughan	Lowe,	 ‘Sustainable	Development	and	Unsustainable	Arguments’	in	Boyle	&	Freestone	eds.	
8	Westerlund,	’Rätt	och	riktigt	rättveteskap’	(n	7)	18.	
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19		Interestingly,	originally	adaptive	management—the	regulative	approach	in	which	the	WFD	also	belongs—was	meant	 to	 form	an	active	 template	 from	which	not	only	managers	 but	 also	 science	 itself	 could	 learn	 lessons:	 C.	 S.	 Holling	 (ed),	 Adaptive	









































30		Aulis	Aarnio,	The	Rational	as	Reasonable:	A	Treatise	on	Legal	Justification	(Reidel,	Dordrecht	cop.	1987),	120-1;	Eveline	T.	Feteris,	'Dialogical	theory	of	legal	discussions:	Pragma-dialectical	 analysis	 and	 evaluation	 of	 legal	 argumentation'	 (2000)	 8(2)	Artificial	 Intelligence	 and	 Law	 115,	 122;	 Douglas	 Fisher,	 Legal	 Reasoning	 in	









32	Aarnio,	 The	 Rational	 as	 Reasonable	 (n	 30)	 189-92;	 Fisher	 Legal	 Reasoning	 in	
Environmental	Law	(n	30)	17.	
33	Jerzy	Wróblewski,	Meaning	and	truth	in	judicial	decision	(Juridica	1979)	132.	

















																																																																																																																																																																							question	whether	the	WFD	in	general	has	any	normative	weight	or	not.	Opinion	of	AG	Jääskinen	 in	 Case	 C-461/13	 (ECLI:EU:C:2014:2324,	 23.10.2014)	 elucidates	 the	dilemma,	see	text	at	fn	(40).	


























































46		 Richard	 A.	 Posner,	 Economic	 Analysis	 of	 Law	 (Volume	 3.	 ed,	 Little,	 Brown	 &	Company	1986),	20–22.	
47	Siltala,	 Law,	 Truth	 and	 Reason	 (n	 45)	 109-12,	 in	 which	 Siltala	 is	 rather	 critical	towards	 the	postulates	 chosen	 in	 law	and	economics.	 Siltala’s	 critique	concerns	 the	lack	of	 institutional	support	provided	to	those	 facing	the	economic	consequences	of	law:	ibid	112.	Like	Dworkin,	Siltala	asks	why	economic	efficiency	in	particular	should	be	 given	 priority	 in	 legal	 interpretation:	 see	 Ronald	 Dworkin,	A	Matter	of	Principle		(Harvard	 University	 Press	 1985)	 266ff.	 Also	 e.g.	 S.	 A.	 Shapiro	 and	 C.	 H.	 Schroeder,	'Beyond	 cost-benefit	 analysis:	 A	 pragmatic	 reorientation'	 (2008)	 32	 Harvard	Environmental	 Law	 Review	 433,	 439–40.	 and	 Douglas	 A.	 Kysar,	 Regulating	 from	





































54	Linnunlaulupykälät	or	’birdsong	sections’	as	a	part	of	jargon	of	environmental	law	practitioners	 was	 first	 mentioned	 in	 the	 literature	 in	 1998,	 Tapio	 Määttä	‘Lainsäätäjän	 kunnioittamisasenne,	 tavoitteellinen	 laintulkinta	 ja	 lakien	tavoitesäännökset	 vallitsevassa	 tuomarinideologiassa’	 in	 Auri	 Pakarinen,	 Anna	Hyvärinen	and	Kaijus	Ervasti	(eds),	Lainvalmistelu,	tutkimus,	yhteiskunta:	Jyrki	Talan	








55	For	example,	see	the	repealed	Finnish	EPA	1	§	(n	46):		’The	objective	of	this	Act	is:	1)	 to	 prevent	 the	 pollution	 of	 the	 environment	 and	 to	 repair	 and	 reduce	 damage	caused	by	pollution;	2)	to	safeguard	a	healthy,	pleasant	and	ecologically	diverse	and	sustainable	 environment;	 3)	 to	 prevent	 the	 generation	 and	 the	 harmful	 effects	 of	waste;	4)	to	improve	and	integrate	assessment	of	the	impact	of	activities	that	pollute	the	 environment;	 5)	 to	 improve	 citizens'	 opportunities	 to	 influence	 decisions	concerning	the	environment;	6)	to	promote	sustainable	use	of	natural	resources;	and	7)	to	combat	climate	change	and	otherwise	support	sustainable	development’.	







																																																																																																																																																																							legal	order	calling	 itself	positivist.	Unveiling	 the	myths—for	example	 the	one	of	 the	invisible	 hand,	 or	 of	 unlimited	 resources	 or	 of	 rational	 behaviour—highlights	 how	positivism	cannot	escape	moral	choices.	Ibid	19−20.	
57	Here	‘teleological	argumentation’	is	used	to	mean	different	forms	of	argumentation	focusing	on	the	aims	of	the	legislator,	the	final	outcome	of	the	decision	and	so	forth.	


















61		 Jonathan	 Verschuuren,	 Principles	 of	 Environmental	 Law:	 The	 Ideal	 of	 Sustainable	


















































72	Jürgen	Habermas,	Between	 facts	and	norms:	 contributions	 to	a	discourse	 theory	of	
law	and	democracy	(Polity	Press	1996)	259.	
73 	According	 to	 Alexy,	 there	 are	 three	 aspects	 in	 his	 theory	 which	 defend	 its	rationality:	the	pareto-optimality	of	balancing,	the	Law	of	Balancing	(i.e.	‘The	greater	
the	 degree	 of	 non-satisfaction	 of,	 or	 detriment	 to,	 one	 principle,	 the	 greater	 the	



















76	Ibid	54	(emphasis	added).	There	are	naturally	other	ways	to	criticize	and	nuance	Dworkin’s	 clear	 separation	 between	 principles	 and	 rules.	 E.g.	 according	 to	 Aarnio,	rules	and	principles	form	a	cline	that	can	be	divided	in	four:	’rules	proper’,	’rule-like	principles’,	 ’principle-like-rules’	 and	 ’principles	 proper’,	 see	 Aarnio,	 Taking	 Rules	
Seriously	(n	64)	184.	He	also	gives	examples	of	positive	legal	principles,	dividing	them	into	 ’formally	 valid	 principles’,	 ’legal	 generalizations’,	 ’decision-making	 principles’	and	’extrasystemic	principles’,	Aarnio,	Taking	Rules	Seriously	(n	64)	183–84.	










79	The	 Weight	 Formula	 is	 the	 second	 law	 regarding	 balancing,	 the	 first	 being	 the	(Substantive)	 Law	 of	 Balancing	 which	 states	 ‘The	 greater	 the	 degree	 of	 non-satisfaction	 of,	 or	 detriment	 to,	 one	 right	 or	 principle,	 the	 greater	 must	 be	 the	importance	 of	 satisfying	 the	 other.’	 Alexy,	 A	 Theory	 of	 Constitutional	 Rights	 (n	73)	102,	Robert	Alexy	'On	Balancing	and	Subsumption.	A	Structural	Comparison'	(2003)	16(4)	Ratio	Juris	433,	446.	










82	Repealed	 Environmental	 Protection	 Act	 3.1.1	 §	 (2000/86)	 is	 available	 in	 English	<http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2000/en20000086.pdf>,	 unfortunately	its	 replacement	 from	 2014	 has	 not	 yet	 been	 officially	 translated	 (527/2014,	http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/2014/20140527)	(n	46).	The	concept	of	pollution	has	remained	practically	intact.	








84 Environmental	 Protection	 Act	 (86/2000)	 1	§,	 sub-section	 1).	<http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2000/en20000086.pdf>	 accessed	 18	February	2014.	










88	Permits	 according	 to	 the	Water	 Act	 (587/2011)	 are	 usually	 also	 needed	 for	 the	trenches	 dug	 through	 and	 adjacent	 to	 the	 production	 site.	 Water	 Act	 (587/2011)	(In	Finnish)	 <http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/ajantasa/2011/20110587>	 accessed	 18	February	2014.	









91		 Ismo	 Pölönen,	 Ympäristövaikutusten	 arviointimenettely:	 tutkimus	 YVA-menettelyn	
oikeudellisesta	 asemasta	 ja	 kehittämistarpeista	 ympäristöllisen	 vaikuttavuuden	







































101	The	difference	between	 the	more	 familiar	Subsumption	Formula	and	 the	Weight	Formula	is	that	the	former	follows	the	rules	of	logic,	the	latter	the	rules	of	arithmetic,	i.e.	the	first-mentioned	represents	a	classifying	dimension	of	legal	reasoning,	the	last-mentioned	a	graduated	one.	Alexy,	‘On	Balancing	and	Subsumption’	(n	79)	448.	
102	See	text	at	fn	(72).	
103	See	text	at	and	from	fn	(33).	
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deterioration	of	ecosystems.	It	also	might	be	that	the	most	efficient	way	to	bring	about	a	paradigmatic	shift	would	be	to	argue	for	a	change	in	the	kind	of	judicial	decision-making	which	is	carried	out	on	a	daily	basis.	
